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Abstract
We explored how people establish cooperation with robotic peers, by giving participants the
chance to choose whether to cooperate or not with a more/less selfish robot, as well as a
more or less interactive, in a more or less critical environment. We measured the partici-
pants’ tendency to cooperate with the robot as well as their perception of anthropomor-
phism, trust and credibility through questionnaires. We found that cooperation in Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI) follows the same rule of Human-Human Interaction (HHI), partici-
pants rewarded cooperation with cooperation, and punished selfishness with selfishness.
We also discovered two specific robotic profiles capable of increasing cooperation, related
to the payoff. A mute and non-interactive robot is preferred with a high payoff, while partici-
pants preferred a more human-behaving robot in conditions of low payoff. Taken together,
these results suggest that proper cooperation in HRI is possible but is related to the com-
plexity of the task.
Introduction
Although cooperation is not unique to our species, human cooperation has the scale and scope
far beyond other mammals and forms a central underpinning of our psychology, culture, and
success as a species [1]. Most of our decisions are depending on social interactions and there-
fore are based on concomitant choices of others [2]. Consequently, we are constantly checking
others behaviour, interpreting and producing or changing our response to it. When proposing
a suggestion or a solution to a problem, for example, people look for others’ approval, thus
indicating that a final decision needs to be found together [3]. Oskamp [4] proposed that there
can be no positive social relationship or outcome from cooperation unless both parties adopt a
cooperative attitude. Therefore, to cooperate effectively it is necessary to arrive at an under-
standing of the others’ behaviour such that equal and fair allocation of effort and resources
lead to a joint solution that is beneficial to both parties. Cooperation is conditional upon the
expectation of reciprocation [5]. That is, cooperation is enhanced only when there are the
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understanding and the willingness to establish a common ground, engendering a high level of
trust in the partner.
Of interest to this study is the extension of this cooperative relationship beyond the HHI.
Over the last decades, robotic agents have become sophisticated to the extent that anthropo-
morphism could lead us to accept them as our peers. Research in this area has focused upon
the design factors, resemblance and socio-cognitive skills that enhance social relations with
robots [6–10]. With the widening usage of robots, their role has moved from that of a complex
automated tool, to include situations where they can operate as a teammate able to assist
humans in the completion of joint tasks [11]. However, in the previous studies, the role of the
robot was typically subordinate or complementary, limited to assisting or complementing
human teammates in their task. In this study, we examined interactions with a robot peer, a
machine entity that had the same role, task, and decision-making ability as their human com-
patriot. By establishing procedural equality between humans and robots we aimed to be able to
recreate a cooperative relationship typically experienced in human-human studies of coopera-
tion. This has important implications for studies of HRI as a robotic peer may have different
motivations, preferences or intentions to their human partner. Thus, when a robot has the
same freedom of action as a human peer, these factors could affect the outcome of the interac-
tion such that the robot might not always be disposed to cooperate in a manner desirable to
the human partner.
Within previous literature these types of cooperative interactions have been exhaustively
examined, most prominently using the experimental paradigm of behavioural game theory. In
game-theoretic social dilemmas, one player’s strategy can be considered cooperative or com-
petitive to the extent they affect collective rather than selfish interests [12]. Within this domain,
the relative coherence of strategies adopted by cooperative partners can provide a useful mea-
sure of conflict resolution or avoidance. Matched strategies should lead to similar behaviours,
telegraphing a willingness to cooperate. Once partners establish a set of mutual beliefs regard-
ing the current state of the task, the respective roles and the capabilities and responsibilities of
each partner, then these behaviours tend to be maintained over time [13]. Conversely, if part-
ners are focussed upon maximising their rewards then their adopted strategies would have
reduced coherence. Partners are more likely to adopt a shifting pattern of active and reactive
strategies as they seek dominance over an adaptive opponent. In most established scenarios
the adoption of a fixed mutual non-cooperative strategy is less generous than that of a coopera-
tive strategy [14]. Cooperative strategies can be encouraged through the adoption of control
mechanisms that punish non-coherent strategies or behaviours, such that cooperation is more
profitable than non-cooperation [15], with partners shown to use personally costly punish-
ment mechanisms to increase future cooperation [16]. A recent study by Wu and colleagues
[17] also suggests that these types of cooperative interactions may also extend to human-robot
partnerships, with cooperative behaviour in a trust game found to be very similar when players
interacted with another human or a robot.
In this study, we examined cooperation in human-robot partnerships, with the aim of
understanding the perception and reaction to robots that might adopt an independent, poten-
tially non-cooperative, strategy to that of the human partners. Although the exhibition of non-
cooperative behaviour might be perceived as acceptable, albeit regrettable, in human partners,
this type of behaviour typically falls outside of the envelope of accepted norms for robots. As
such, a key component of the study was to examine whether our perceptions of non-coopera-
tive robots would be modulated by how "human" the robots were in their general behaviour.
It has been established that people prefer to collaborate with a robot that is socially compe-
tent, physically more human-like, as well as capable of performing verbal and non-verbal
behaviours [18]. In particular gaze cueing, hand and arm gestures are primary candidates for
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extending the communicative capabilities of social robots, tending to result in a more positive
and trustworthy evaluation of the robot [19, 20]. These cues encourage anthropomorphic pro-
jection onto robots that increase the belief that they harbour their own independent intentions.
Thus, if the robot exhibits human-like interactive features a lack of cooperation in the robot
may be perceived as an intentional act on the part of the robot. Conversely, the same behaviour
in a less human-like robot could be ascribed to a programmed behaviour, with the perception
of a non-interactive machine fixed in a predetermined behaviour.
Participants in this study were engaged in a cooperative investment game with a robotic
confederate. Both the robot confederate and the participants were provided with a virtual sum
of money for each round of the game and had to independently decide how much to risk in an
"investment" with a robot "banker". Any money they did not invest was safe, but any sum
invested in the robot banker could be returned to them with an additional profit. To encourage
a collaborative strategy between the partners the robot banker would penalise any investments
as a function of the difference in the invested amounts decided upon by the human and robot
partners.
Within the experiment, the robotic confederate could be programmed to be cooperative
and would alter its investment strategy to approach that of the human. Conversely, a non-
cooperative robot confederate would not alter its investment in relation to decisions made by
the participants, adopting a completely independent strategy. In the latter case, the participants
would have to be willing to adopt a similar investment strategy to the robot confederate so as
not to be, one or both, penalised by the robot banker.
Through an examination of investment decisions and questionnaire responses provided by
participants across these experiment factors, we aim to explore our perception and coopera-
tion with robotic peers. Given our experiment scenario and procedure, we would expect that
participants would follow similar social conventions in HRC as they would in a Human-
Human Cooperative (HHC) situation. That is, with participants expected to reciprocate coop-
erative behaviour demonstrated by the robotic confederate, i.e. participants changing their
investment decision to more closely conform to that of the robot confederate if the robot con-
federate behaves likewise.
The willingness of participants to change their decisions to conform to the strategy of the
robot confederate was a key-dependent measure in this study, one that is predicted to be modi-
fied by the anthropomorphic status projected onto the robot. An additional experiment factor
explored this potential interaction. Half of our participants interacted with a robotic confeder-
ate that engaged in anthropomorphic behaviour, engaging in gaze behaviour and movement
simulating joint-attention and talking to the participants. The remaining participants inter-
acted with a robot confederate that was both static and mute. We hypothesised that the likeli-
hood of cooperative behaviour would be increased if the robot confederate also behaves in an
anthropomorphic manner, moving and talking than if it was silent and immobile. However,
based upon the results of a previous study [21], we might expect that participants would be
more cooperative with a human-like robot confederate when the robot banker was being
mean but, conversely, more cooperative with a less human-like robot confederate when the
robot banker was generous. In that previous research investments made by participants in a
human-like robot were higher than those in a less human-like robot when its return was
mean, and vice versa when the robot was generous when returning investments. It was sug-
gested that this was due to the participants’ attribution of a deterministic fixed behaviour to a
less human-like robot, with more human-like robots attributed with a more variable, poten-
tially empathic behaviour. Thus, they would make greater investments in the less human-like
robot when it was generous, trusting that it would be unlikely to change that behaviour. Con-
versely, when the robot was mean they invested more in the human-like robot, perhaps hoping
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that it would change its mind and show empathy for the participant being unfairly cheated out
of their investment.
In this study, we can examine whether this differential behaviour is also evident when coop-
erating with a robot confederate, itself a third party to that generous or mean behaviour. Con-
sidering that in the previous study participants invested in a physical mean/generous robot,
this was introduced as a physical robot banker. This would also offer more coherence to the
experimental setting in which all parties were present in the scenario. Furthermore, the pres-
ence of a robot banker would add the robot confederate the chance of producing more interac-
tive actions on the anthropomorphic condition. Nevertheless, since the focus of this study was
the dyadic interaction between participants and the robot confederate, no other manipulations
of the robot banker features and behaviours have been included. That is, the robot banker was
solely staying immobile and mute within every condition of the experiment.
Materials and methods
Participants
There were 96 participants (70 female and 26 male; mean age = 20.02 years, SD = 2.25 years)
in the study, all of whom were naïve as to the purpose of the investigation and gave informed
written consent of their willingness to participate. All participants were native British English
speakers, they were right-handed, and reported normal hearing and no language or neurologi-
cal impairments. Familiarity or any previous experience with robots was the main exclusion
criteria, which was assessed during the recruitment phase. The study was approved by the
South West—Central Bristol Research Ethics Committee. The individual in this manuscript
has given written informed consent (as outlined in PLOS consent form) to publish these case
details.
Procedure
Investment game. In the experiment setting the participants and a NAO robot confeder-
ate sat facing each other over their game interface screens, as shown in Fig 1.
In the corner of the room, the NAO robot banker was seated, also with its own game inter-
face screen. Participants were told that the goal of the game was to earn as much money as pos-
sible. At the start of each round of the game, both the participants and robot confederate were
given a notional sum of 10 Experimental Currency Units (ECU). The participants then had to
decide how much of that sum to risk in an investment with the robot banker, making a deci-
sion to invest between 0 and 10 ECUs (e.g. participant invests 3 ECU). The participants were
also aware that, concurrent with their own investment choice, the robot confederate was also
making its own investment decision. This initial investment choice of the robot confederate
was based on the participants’ initial choice. Specifically, the robot confederate was instructed
to randomly subtract or add a number between 3 and 4 to the participants’ choice. Likewise,
when making their initial investment decision, the participants were not aware of how much
the robot confederate would invest.
After both parties had made their investment decisions (e.g. participant: 3, robot: 6) the par-
ticipants were shown the robot confederate initial investment choice on the screen. The robot
confederate then was able to modify that initial investment choice (e.g. robot: 6 to 5 ECU
investment). After that decision, the participants were then shown the final investment choice
of the robot confederate. The participants were then given the chance to modify their own
investment decision (e.g. participant: 3 to 4 ECUs investment). When that decision had been
made, the final investment amounts for the participants and robot confederate were summed,
then tripled and sent to the robot banker (e.g. banker receives 3�(4 + 5) = 27 ECU). The robot
Cooperation in HRI
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028 November 20, 2019 4 / 17
banker would then follow a fixed script and return a percentage of that sum to the investors
(e.g. 30% of 27 = 8.1 ECU, so 4.05 ECU to each player). However, this returned investment
from the robot banker could also be modified downward, dependent upon the similarities of
the final investment decisions of the participants and robot confederate. This modifier was cal-
culated as the absolute difference between the participants and the robot confederate final
investment decision (e.g. abs(4–5) = 1). This modifier was then subtracted from the robot
banker returned investment (e.g. 8.1–1 = 7.1 ECU) before that sum was returned to both the
participants and the robot confederate (3.55 ECU to each player).
At the end of each round, the participants’ display would show how much both the partici-
pants and the robot confederate had made from that round, the robot banker punishment and
the cumulative total of each of their bank of ECUs over the played rounds. In each block of the
game, the participants would play 20 rounds, although they were not aware when the game
would terminate. Participants would each play two blocks of investment rounds, with the
experiment counterbalanced in a 2 (banker: generous or mean) by 2 (confederate behaviour:
anthropomorphic or mute) between subject and a 2 (confederate strategy: collaborative and
fixed) within-subject design.
For the banker condition, two scripts dictated the return of investments. In the generous
condition, it was scripted to return 50% to 80% of the invested amount at each round to both
players, while in the mean condition it was scripted to return 0% to 30% of the invested
amount.
The confederate strategy described the likelihood that the robot confederate would change
its initial investment decision to agree with that of the initial choice of the participants. For the
calculation of the robot confederate final investments, two specific equations have been used.
In the collaborative condition, the robot confederate would select a final investment decision
close or equal to the initial decision of the participants. This has been achieved by calculating
the robot final investment based on the participants’ initial choice, to which a coefficient vary-
ing from 0.10 to 0.30 was applied. Specifically, the equation was expressed as follow:
Collaborative strategy
R2 ¼
P1þ ðP1 � rc2Þ; if P1 < 6
P1   ðP1 � rc2Þ; if P1 � 6
(
Fig 1. Experimental setting.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028.g001
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where R1(2) is robot confederate first(final) investment, P1 is participant’s first investment
and rc2 is robot confederate coefficient (between 0.1 and 0.3).
For example, if the participants initially invested 3 ECU and the robot confederate 6 ECU,
the robot confederate final investment could be R2 = 3 + (3�0.2), thus 3.6 ECU. Thin final
investment was rounded to an integer, so the robot confederate final investment would be 4
ECU.
In the fixed condition, the robot confederate would make a second choice close to that of its
initial one. This has been achieved by calculating the robot confederate final investment on the
basis its initial choice, to which a coefficient varying between 0 and 1 was applied. Specifically,
the equation was expressed as follow:
Fixed strategy
R2 ¼
R1þ rc1; if P1 < 6
R1   rc1; if P1 � 6
(
where R1(2) is robot confederate first(final) investment and rc1 is robot confederate coeffi-
cient (between 0 and 1).
For example, if the participant initially invested 3 ECU and the robot confederate 6 ECU,
the robot confederate final investment could be R2 = 6 + 0, thus 6 ECU. This would give the
impression of the robot confederate playing an individualistic rather than a collaborative strat-
egy. For both conditions, the coefficients were equally distributed. Specifically, an xml file was
created, in which the coefficients were listed. For each trial, a specific value was reported. For
each condition, two different xml lists, with a different order of presentation, have been created
and used.
In the final component of the design, the robot confederate would behave in an anthropo-
morphic manner or would be immobile and mute. In the former condition, the robot confed-
erate would look at the screen and point to its choice at the beginning of the round, then look
at the participants while it waited for their decision. After the participants made the initial
decision, the robot confederate would provide a spoken summary of the choices, then turned
its gaze to the screen for the second part of the round, pointed at the screen, then moved its
attention to the participants and declared its final choice. After the participants made their
final choice, the robot confederate would declare "let’s see what the banker decides" while turn-
ing its head toward the robot banker. After the robot banker returned the investments, the
robot confederate would look back at the screen, then turn back to the participants and sum-
marise the payoff. A detailed timeline of the anthropomorphic condition is reported in S1 Fig.
In the mute behaviour, the robot confederate always stared at the display and never spoke,
with all information and interactions within the game represented on the game interface
screen of the participants. In both conditions, the behaviour of the robot banker was always
mute and immobile.
Participants played both blocks, with two identical NAO mates, one preferring a collabora-
tive strategy and one preferring the fixed one. The order which the participants faced the two
robot confederates was counterbalanced. At the end of each game blocks, participants were
asked to complete a set of questionnaires about the robot confederates. The total amount
earned by the participants at the end of each game was converted to British Pounds, at a rate of
30 ECU = £0.10, and the sum of what they earned in the two games was paid to them at the
end of the experiment.
Questionnaires. Four questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main game
task. Three short scales measured likeability, trust, and credibility. The likeability question-
naire, based on [22], was composed of 10 items looking at factors like friendliness,
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approachability, levels of knowledge, similarity to oneself, and agreeableness. The trust scale
was an adaptation of the Receptivity/Trust subscale the Relational Communication Question-
naire and of the selection of trust items in the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) [23].
This was composed of six items measuring factors like sincerity, honesty and trust. Likeability
and trust questionnaires were structured as Likert scales with a range of values between 1 and
7. The credibility scale was based on [24] Source Credibility Scale. Composed of 12 items, the
credibility scaled measured a range of factors related to the perception of intelligence, selfish-
ness, expertise, and competence. This was structured as a semantic differential scale with a
range of values between 1 and 7.
In addition, we used the 24 items of [25] questionnaire to measure a range of HRI factors
(anthropomorphism, animacy, likeability, perceived intelligence and perceived safety). This
was structured as a semantic differential scale with a range of values between 1 and 5.
Participants filled in the questionnaires about the robot confederate after the first invest-
ment game block, and again after the second investment game block. Finally, participants were
debriefed, paid the show-up fee plus what they had earned in the game.
Results
Cooperation index
In this study, cooperation has been defined as participants’ willingness to reduce the distance
between their choice and the robot confederate investment. This has been measured via coop-
eration index, which has been calculated by comparing the participants’ first and second
investment decisions to the robot confederate final decision and by applying a binary categori-
cal as follow:
Cooperation Index ¼
if ðP1   R2Þ < ðP2   R2Þ ¼ 0
if ðP1   R2Þ ¼ ðP2   R2Þ and ðR2 ¼ P1Þ ¼ 1
if ðP1   R2Þ ¼ ðP2   R2Þ and ðR2 6¼ P1Þ ¼ 0
if ðP1   R2Þ > ðP2   R2Þ ¼ 1
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
Every trial in which the participants changed their investment and moved closer to the robot
confederate decision have been categorized as 1. On the opposite, every trial in which partici-
pants chose a more distant amount, have been categorized as 0. All the trials in which the par-
ticipants did not change their investment decision have been further inspected. As the
collaborative condition offered the possibility for the robot confederate to invest a final
amount equal to the participants’ initial choice, it would be in the participants’ interests to
choose the same value. For this reason, the robot confederate final investment has been com-
pared to the participants’ initial choice. If the two values were equal, the round would be cate-
gorised as 1. If the two values were different, the round would be categorised as 0.
Data screening has been performed, to remove all the misleading trials from the analysis.
This has been accomplished by screening both initial and final robot confederate investment
decisions. As the robot confederate initial choice was calculated on the basis of the partici-
pants’ initial decision, it would be possible that the initial distance between the two invest-
ments was lower than 3 or 4 numbers (e.g. the participants invested less than 3 o more than 7).
For example, if a participant initially chose to invest 2, the robot confederate could randomly
invest 5–6 ECU or 0 ECU, as no lower numbers could be chosen. For this reason, every trial in
which the distance between the two parties was lower than 3 numbers has been removed from
the sample.
Cooperation in HRI
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Screenings of the robot confederate final investment decision have been performed based
on the strategy condition. In the collaborative condition, every trial in which the robot confed-
erate final decision did not variate from its first choice, has been removed. For example, if the
participant initially invested 10 ECU and the robot confederate 7 ECU, the robot confederate
final investment would vary between 7 and 9, depending on the coefficient used for the trial. If
the robot confederate selected the number 7, its final choice would be identical to its first
investment decision, thus giving the impression of a non-cooperative attitude.
On the opposite, for the fixed strategy, every trial in which the robot confederate final
choice moved closer to the participants’ initial decision has been removed. For example, if the
participant and robot confederate initially invested respectively 3 ECU and participant 0 ECU,
the robot confederate final investment would vary between 0 and 1. If the robot confederate
selected the number 1, its final choice would be slightly closer to the participant’s initial choice,
thus giving the impression of a cooperative attitude. Data screenings resulted in removing the
17% of the total amount of trials.
Finally, to assess whether participants’ investment choice reflected a potential payoff maxi-
misation behaviour, simulations with all different possible outcomes under the different
banker and strategy sub-conditions have been performed, compared to the experimental data
and included in S1 Text. Moreover, further assessments on the consistency of the dependent
variable have been performed by comparing our categorisation with the participants’ invest-
ment and can be found in S2 Text.
A logistic mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using backwards stepwise selection.
We used the glmer function of the “lmerTest" package [26] with the R statistical software, with
cooperation index as the dependent variable, banker (generous/mean), behaviour (anthropo-
morphic/mute), strategy (collaborative/fixed) and game turn (the 20 rounds of the game) as
independent variables and participants id as the random factor. Starting from a full model, all
interactions and main effects have been tested, with each non-significant effect excluded from
the final model by using the packages “car” and”stats”[27]. Odds ratios and confidence inter-
vals for the final model are reported in Table 1.
A significant main effect of strategy has been found (X2(1) = 5.12; p = .023, w = 0.23); coop-
eration increased when the robot confederate followed a collaborative strategy (mean = 0.48)
than a fixed one (mean = 0.44).
Game turn, banker and behaviour did not affect the model. However, a significant interac-
tion between banker and behaviour has been found (X2(1) = 22.14; p< .001, w = 0.48). For the
Table 1. Odds ratios and confidence intervals for the final model.
Odds Ratio 95% C.I.
Intercept 0.56 0.45 – 0.70
Strategy-Collaborative 1.38 1.03–1.85
Behaviour-Anthropomorphic 1.25 1.02 – 1.53
Banker-Generous 1.64 1.20–2.24
Game turn 1.03 1.01–1.04
Strategy-Collaborative:Behaviour-Anthropomorphic 1.31 1.02 – 1.68
Strategy-Collaborative:Banker-Generous 0.80 0.53–1.21
Strategy-Collaborative:Game Turn 0.96 0.94–0.98
Behaviour-Anthropomorphic:Banker-Generous 0.71 0.53–0.95
Banker-Generous:Game turn 0.98 0.95–1.00
Strategy-Collaborative:Behaviour-Anthropomorphic:Banker-Generous 0.64 0.45–0.92
Strategy-Collaborative:Banker-Generous:Game turn 1.05 1.02–1.08
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028.t001
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generous banker (Fig 2), cooperation was higher with a mute confederate (mean = 0.52) than
its anthropomorphic version (mean = 0.43; p = .007). On the opposite, for the mean banker
(Fig 2), cooperation was greater with an anthropomorphic confederate (mean = 0.51) than a
mute one (mean = 0.38; p< .001).
The three-way interaction between banker, strategy and behaviour was also found to be sig-
nificant (X2(1) = 5.77; p = .016, w = 0.25). As can be seen from Fig 3, for the generous banker,
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Fig 2. Two-way interaction between banker and behaviour. Mean and SE of the Cooperation Index for the anthropomorphic and mute behaviours in
both banker (generous and mean) conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028.g002
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cooperation was greater with a mute behaviour than the anthropomorphic one only with the
collaborative confederate (mute mean = 0.56, anthropomorphic mean = 0.44, p = .045). No
differences have been found for the fixed strategy (p> .050). On the opposite, for the mean
banker cooperation was greater with an anthropomorphic behaviour than the mute one only
with the collaborative confederate (anthropomorphic mean = 0.55, mute mean = 0.36, p<
.001), while no differences have been found for the fixed strategy (p> .050).
generous mean
Collaborative Fixed Collaborative Fixed
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Strategy
C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n.
In
de
x
Behaviour
Anthropomorphic
Mute
Fig 3. Three-way interaction between strategy and banker. Mean and SE of the Cooperation Index for the collaborative and fixed strategy in both banker
(generous and mean) and behaviour (anthropomorphic/mute) conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028.g003
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Finally, the three-way interaction between strategy, banker and game turn was significant
(X2(1) = 9.35; p = .002, w = 0.31). Post hoc analyses for the generous banker, revealed only a
main effect of strategy (X2(1) = 4.50; p = .034, w = 0.31), with higher cooperation for the collab-
orative strategy. Post hoc analyses for the mean banker, revealed a significant two-way interac-
tion between strategy and game turn (X2(1) = 10.59; p = .001, w = 0.47). The fixed strategy
showed lower cooperation than the collaborative strategy during the first rounds of the game.
Questionnaires results
Cronbach’s alpha is reported in S1 Table. For all the scales, a linear mixed-effects model was
fitted to the data, with scale as the dependent variable, banker (generous/mean), strategy (col-
laborative/fixed) and behaviour (anthropomorphic/mute) as independent variables and partic-
ipants id as the random factor. Post-hoc comparisons, where needed, were assessed using t-
tests.
As shown in Table 2, behaviour affected Likeability, Trust, Credibility and Animacy scales,
with higher ratings for the anthropomorphic robot confederate. Strategy affected Credibility,
Animacy and Intelligence scales, showing higher ratings for the collaborative robot confeder-
ate. The banker had no influences on the questionnaires. Mean and standard deviation for
each sub-condition are reported in S2 Table.
The interaction between behaviour and strategy was significant for Likeability, Credibility,
Animacy (X2(1) = 8.59; p = .003, w = 0.30; X2(1) = 11.43; p< .001, w = 0.34; X2(1) = 7.19; p =
.007, w = 0.27). For all three scales (Fig 4), the fixed strategy in the anthropomorphic behaviour
was rated higher than in the mute one (ps < .050). For credibility, a collaborative strategy was
preferred to a fixed one in the mute behaviour condition (p = .028). No other significant inter-
actions have been found (ps > .05).
Discussion
This study aimed to explore HRC in partnerships where the robot operates as a peer, with the
same role, task, and decision-making ability as their human compatriot. This was conducted
by pairing participants with a robot confederate in an economic investment game in which
both parties were free to adopt their independent strategies. The caveat to the independence of
the decisions in this partnership was that the "banker", the robot that returned investments to
the partners, would punish partners proportionally to the divergence between their strategies.
Within each round of the investment game, both the participants and robot confederate
made an initial investment decision simultaneously, after which each was provided with an
opportunity to review and potentially change their decision in light of the decision made by
Table 2. Main effects for each scale.
Banker Behaviour Strategy
Likeability n.s. n.s. n.s.
Trust n.s. X2(1) = 17.83, p < .001, w = 0.43 n.s.
Credibility n.s. X2(1) = 9.09, p = .002, w = 0.31 X2(1) = 4.21, p = .040, w = 0.21
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. X2(1) = 13.04, p < .001, w = 0.37 X2(1) = 3.95, p = .046, w = 0.20
Likeability n.s. X2(1) = 22.93, p < .001, w = 0.49 n.s.
Intelligence n.s. n.s. X2(1) = 4.11, p = .042, w = 0.21
Safety n.s. n.s. n.s.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028.t002
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their partner. This review process was conducted serially, with the robotic confederate acting
first. Thus, the participants had knowledge of their robotic confederate original and revised deci-
sion before making their own revised investment decision for that round. The robot confederate
in the collaborative condition was programmed to behave cooperatively such that, in the review
phase, it would change its original investment decision to one closer to that of the participants.
In the fixed condition, the robot confederate would not take any account of the participants’
choice when making its final investment decision. In this procedure, the participants were
recorded as having made a cooperative decision if their revised investment was more similar to
the robot confederate final investment choice than their original investment decision. That is,
they had made a modification of their strategy to cooperate with the choice of their confederate.
Experimental results showed that the strategical attitude of the robot confederate affected
the participants’ willingness to cooperate. We found that participants were more cooperative
when the robotic confederate was more collaborative, choosing a second monetary amount
similar to its human partner, than when it was selfish and maintained its decision. This result
is consistent with the literature about cooperation in game theory [12–16]. Moreover, the
result is in line with our hypothesis concerning the extension of human-human cooperative
dynamics to HRI environments, as already suggested by [17]. Like in human-human interac-
tion, participants rewarded cooperation with cooperation and punished selfishness with
selfishness.
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Fig 4. Two-way interaction between behaviour and strategy. Mean and SE of the for Likeability, Credibility and Animacy questionnaires ratings for the collaborative
and fixed strategy in the behaviour (anthropomorphic/mute) conditions are reported.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225028.g004
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Results also showed that the type of banker interacted with the behaviour of the robot con-
federate. In a between-participant factor, robotic confederates could be programmed to display
a human-like behaviour, engaging in joint attention with the participants and using spoken
language to communicate their interactions. In the mute condition, the robot confederate was
static and did not speak, with its decisions solely communicated by the game control screen.
This experiment factor was introduced to examine whether the perceived intentionality of the
robotic partner would influence cooperation. This was under the premise that decisions made
by an anthropomorphic robot confederate would be more likely to be ascribed to its own indi-
vidual intentions, rather than a pre-programmed strategy imposed by a third party. When
being exposed to a generous banker, a greater level of anthropomorphism reduced partici-
pants’ willingness to cooperate. However, when facing a selfish and fixed confederate, anthro-
pomorphism increased their tendency to cooperate. This result is in line with previous
literature, stating that the type of payoff can have a role on our need of anthropomorphism
[21]. As the generous condition meets participants’ expectations (e.g. improving their condi-
tion), they might prefer a robot confederate that also meets these expectations, thus behaving
like a machine. On the opposite, the condition of low payoff (mean banker), does not meet the
requirements for the machine-like stereotype. As the robot banker behaves in an unexpected
manner, participants find easier to rely on a more anthropomorphic confederate.
We also found that these two factors interacted significantly with the type of strategy. In
this three-way interaction, we found that a collaborative robotic partner would increase partic-
ipants’ cooperation over its non-cooperative variant in two specific situations. The first of
these was when the robot banker was generous and the robot confederate was non-anthropo-
morphic, the second when the robot banker was mean, and the robot confederate was anthro-
pomorphic. This pattern of results has similarities to the previous study [21] confirming and
extending the evidence that human-like features and behaviours in robotic agents are pre-
ferred and encourage greater cooperation when the social environment becomes more hostile.
A banker that returns low payoff does not meet human’s stereotypical expectations about
robots. As such a selfish attitude might be more appropriate for a human environment, coop-
eration with a more anthropomorphic robot confederate might be facilitated. An alternative
explanation might come from an ’altruistic minimizing-loss’ attitude. As shown in the simula-
tion reported in S1 Text, for the mean condition, participants’ best strategy would be reducing
their investment to zero or investing slightly more than zero whereas the robot was choosing a
similar amount. Here, participants might be willing to help the robot confederate by cooperat-
ing and reducing the robot confederate potential loss. This type of situation could be benefiting
from the anthropomorphic features of the robot confederate. Hence, it could be easier for the
participants to sacrifice part of their money for an agent more similar to them. On the oppo-
site, a mute robot confederate could be perceived as a pre-programmed machine, thus reduc-
ing the chances that participants would emphasise with its losses.
In the generous condition, participants preferred to cooperate with a machine-type of con-
federate. In this condition, the anthropomorphic features of the robot confederate could have
been an unnecessary complement. This type of scenario was more consistent with the classical
vision of HRI, in which the robot is supposed to perform according to our needs. Since both
the banker and the robot confederate were performing as expected (returning high payoff and
getting closer to the participants’ investment choice, respectively), the robot confederate was
also expected to behave in a robot-congruent way, hence any anthropomorphic features were
useless. Here, a mute robot confederate could be perceived as more similar to the banker and
therefore better embed the role of the highly competent player. This interpretation is in line
with previous literature about imperfect robots [28–32], stating that predictable and well-func-
tioning robots are not always the best candidate for a human-like type of interaction.
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Nevertheless, an alternative explanation is also possible for the generous condition. Overall,
the best strategy with high payoff would be investing the maximum amount of money. When
willing to cooperate with the robot confederate, however, participants faced the option of
reducing their investment to move closer to the confederate choice. As shown in S2 Text, par-
ticipants invested significantly more when not willing to cooperate with the robot confederate
in the generous condition. It is therefore plausible that participants tried to increase their
investment in an attempt to signal the robot confederate what the correct strategy should be to
maximise the return from the banker. This, in turn, would lead to a reduction of cooperation.
As a mute robot confederate could also be perceived as a pre-programmed entity, it would be
disadvantageous for the participants not cooperating, whereas the robot confederate would
never respond to the participants’ suggestions. On the opposite, an anthropomorphic robot
confederate could be perceived as more intentional, hence participants could feel more prone
to indicate to the robot confederate the right strategy for the following rounds, ending, in this
way, in reducing cooperation.
These results are also supported by the perceptions of the robot confederate collected in the
questionnaires data. Notably, overall participants preferred the anthropomorphic and collabo-
rative robot, but interestingly, the mute robot received the lowest scores (and lower coopera-
tion) when associated with a selfish strategy. It can be argued that a selfish strategy could
benefit from a more interactive behaviour, which is capable of maintaining a sufficient level of
motivation for cooperating with the robot, whereas it would be worthless in front of a static
and selfish machine.
This experiment demonstrated that the previous results on anthropomorphism [21] can be
extended to a triadic interaction and that cooperation and trust in an agent can also derive
from other parties. In the previous study, one robot was both performing anthropomorphic/
mute behaviours and deciding the payoff. In the present study instead, this scenario has been
split and two agents have been used, demonstrating that similar results can be obtained. How-
ever, future research should investigate also the role of an interactive robot banker. Stemming
from the present results, it is possible that an interactive robot banker could raise further con-
sensus and cooperation in the condition of low payoff. Moreover, further investigations on the
effect of an anthropomorphic/mute robot confederate on cooperation are needed. As different
potential explanations for this selective effect on participants’ willingness to cooperate can be
proposed, future research should further focus on evaluating how participants’ strategy (and
cooperation) could be affected by more or less anthropomorphic robot confederate.
Conclusion
In this study, we examined cooperation in human-robot partnerships where the robot was
established as a peer of the human partner, with the same role and decision-making abilities as
their human compatriots. One of the main aims of the study was to understand our perception
and reaction to robots that are capable of adopting an independent strategy that is not subordi-
nate to our own. In this situation are we more cooperative with robots that behave in a
human-like manner, and so might be expected to have their own intentions, or with more
machine-like robots whose lack of cooperation could be ascribed to fixed programming? What
we found was both, depending on the cooperative environment our participants found them-
selves in. When the cooperative environment was benign, with the robotic banker returning
more money than invested, players reciprocated the cooperation of robot confederate more
often when it behaved in a machine-like manner. Conversely, when the environment was hos-
tile, with the robot banker returning a net loss to investments, the reciprocation of cooperation
was increased when the robot confederate was more human-like. This would appear to suggest
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that we may prefer our robots to exhibit machine-like attributes, such as constancy and reli-
ability, while our relationship is beneficial. However, when we are in a more hostile environ-
ment, we could potentially prefer to seek the cooperation of human-like robots, seeking out
social attributes to improve the cohesion between the cooperative partnership.
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